In this paper, we present more powerful 6-round impossible differentials for large-block Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256 than the ones used by Zhang et al. in ISC 2008. Using those, we can improve the previous impossible differential cryptanalysis of both 9-round Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256. The improvement can lead to 10-round attack on Rijndael-256 as well. With 2 198.1 chosen plaintexts, an attack is demonstrated on 9-round Rijndael-224 with 2 195.2 encryptions and 2 140.4 bytes memory. Increasing the data complexity to 2 216 plaintexts, the time complexity can be reduced to 2 130 encryptions and the memory requirements to 2 93.6 bytes. For 9-round Rijndael-256, we provide an attack requiring 2 229.3 chosen plaintexts, 2 194 encryptions, and 2 139.6 bytes memory. Alternatively, with 2 245.3 plaintexts, an attack with a reduced time of 2 127.1 encryptions and a memory complexity of 2 90.9 bytes can be mounted. With 2 244.2 chosen plaintexts, we can attack 10-round Rijndael-256 with 2 253.9 encryptions and 2 186.8 bytes of memory.
Introduction
is a block cipher designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen built upon a Substitution Permutation Network (SPN). A subset of Rijndael variants has been standardized as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by Rijndael follows the design principles of Square [9] . In its full version, both the block and the key sizes can range from 128 to 256 bits in steps of 32 bits. For AES, the block size of Rijndael is restricted to 128 bits. This paper deals with non-AES Rijndael variants, that is, large-block Rijndael-b, with b > 128 indicating the block size and key size in bits.
AES is probably the most well-studied block cipher, having received about 15 years of extensive public scrutiny by now. Square attacks, impossible differential attacks, boomerang attacks, rectangle attacks and meet-in-the-middle attacks in both the single-key and related-key settings are just several prominent examples of cryptanalysis techniques applied to AES [1, 4-7, 12, 17, 20, 22-24, 26-28] .
The large-block Rijndael is arguably less analyzed, being a highly relevant cipher though. Among others, an important motivation for the study of largeblock Rijndael is the deployment of Rijndael-like permutations in the design of hash functions, Whirlwind [2] and SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [16] constituting some especially interesting instances. We mention here several multiset and integral cryptanalytic results [13, 15, 18, 21] , as well as impossible differential cryptanalysis [19, 25] . In terms of the impossible differential cryptanalysis -the major object of our study in this paper -the best attack has been proposed by Zhang et al. [25] which cryptanalyzes 9-round Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256 with 2 209 and 2 208.8 encryptions, respectively.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis, which was proposed by [3, 8] , is a widely used cryptanalytic technique. The attack starts with finding a certain input difference that can never result in a certain output difference, which makes up an impossible differential. Usually, impossible differentials have truncated input and output differences. By adding rounds before and/or after the impossible differential, one can collect pairs with certain plaintext and ciphertext differences. If there exists a pair that meets the input and output values of the impossible differential under some subkey bits, these bits must be wrong. In this way, we discard as many wrong keys as possible and exhaustively search the rest of the keys. The early abort technique is usually used during the key recovery phase, that is, one does not guess all the subkey bits at once, but guesses some subkey bits instead to discard some pairs that do not satisfy certain conditions step by step. In this case, we can discard the unwished pairs as soon as possible to reduce the time complexity.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we present more powerful 6-round impossible differentials for Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256. Using these impossible differentials, we can improve the existing impossible differential cryptanalyses of both Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256. In addition, the improvement can result in a 10-round attack on Rijndael-256.
Our impossible differentials for both Rijndael-224 and Rijndael-256 have more active bytes in the output difference and, therefore, the number of subkey bytes needed to be guessed during the key recovery phase can range with more options, while the probability for a pair of plaintexts to pass the test of sieving wrong pairs is higher compared to [25] .
